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lives. Yet Sandra Bem's decision to end her life early, rather than continue to live with a likely long and inevitably terminal journey with Alzheimer's disease sits uncomfortably within the dementia care field. As feminists, and as ex-carers for a parent with younger onset
Alzheimer's disease, we admire her personal bravery -and acknowledge how her choice was both enabled through, and constrained by, the relational and legal contexts in which she lived.
Most people with advanced dementia in the UK live and die in care homes and, at this stage of the illness, are profoundly cognitively and physically impaired -likely bedbound, helpless, and unable to communicate either verbally or non-verbally; they may exhibit signs of pain or distress. The need for better palliative care in end stage dementia has been highlighted (Roger, 2006; Simard, 2007) and our perspective as outlined here, whilst feminist, psychological and socio-legal, is also invariably informed by the multiple ways that dementia and death have touched our lives. Thus, we outline here some thoughts about the assisted dying proposals currently being considered in the UK, consider the limits of capacity and 'choice', and, finally, we briefly emphasise the feminist concept of relationality when engaging with end of life decisions and the messy realities of lives impacted by dementia.
A Right to Die?
According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, an individual has the right "to decide how and when to end his [sic] life, provided that said individual is in a position to make up his own mind in that respect and to take the appropriate action." i There
The published version of this article can be found at: http://fap.sagepub.com/ The final, definitive version of this paper will be published in have a "clear and settled intention to end his or her own life". Similarly, it would not assist anyone with dementia who wanted to end their life rather than wait for Alzheimer's disease to run its full course. It appears that the bill has been drafted in such a way as to head off many of the usual arguments against assisted suicide. For instance, firstly, the limitation to those with a terminal illness diagnosis with less than six months to live is designed to avoid any charge that those with chronic health problems or long-term disabilities that require long
The Peel and Rosie Harding] 4 term care (on average £32,250 per person with dementia in the UK for example, Prince et al., 2014) would feel pressurised into assisted suicide to avoid being a burden on either their families or on the state. Second, the requirement that a prescribed lethal dose must be approved by two healthcare professionals, and that the administering doctor needs to remain with the patient until they have self-administered the drug is intended to prevent familial misuse of the provisions. Third, the bill contains not one, but two, capacity-related 'safeguards': first that the patient must have a settled wish to die, which implies that they must have the capacity to make that decision (indeed, s.4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 specifically excludes treatment that intends to bring about a person's death). Second, they must have the physical capacity to self-administer the lethal prescription provided by the prescribing doctor. Arguably then, the Assisted Dying Bill as it is currently configured may create more injustice and inequity in death than it would solve, given the significant limitations on its applicability. Instead of providing a solution to all those who wish to end their lives early, it would help only a minority. And many of those who find their lives intolerable would be excluded from its provision of a peaceful and dignified death.
Capacity, 'Choice'and Relationality in Dementia Contexts
Assisted dying, then, under these proposals (which have much in common with other jurisdictions where it is legal) is restricted to those who have the capacity to make a choice. 'make up their own mind' is, arguably, a fallacy. We need to recognize that agency, making choices, requires relationality -especially with respect to profound notions of ending life.
Even someone who makes their "own" choice to die is facilitated to do so by their relationships. It will be easier for a person to make the decision to die if they know that they have the loving support of their family in making that choice than if they do not. Yet even in recognising the inevitability of relationality, assisted dying remains troubling. If people need their informal support networks to choose death, where are the safeguards, how can we protect the vulnerable, the suggestible, the scared?
There is much discussion and emphasis on living well with dementia in Britain, Europe and internationally. For many people with appropriate health and social care, support and meaningful engagement living well in the early and mid-stages of the disease trajectories is a reality in the UK. But because of the nature and progressivity of most forms of dementia, the possibility of 'dying well' with dementia is thorny, troubled; and autonomy and 'choice' all too often become seen as redundant once an individual's capacity is questioned or questionable. We must find ways to reconcile the right to equal treatment before the law for people with disabilities with the right to choose to die. If we do not, then people with a dementia diagnosis, as in the case of Sandra Bem, may find that if they are to exercise any 'choice' about how their life with dementia will end, then an early end, even earlier than it needs to be, remains their only possibility. 
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